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Abstract
Previous research has found a negative effect of corruption on growth in
the United States. However, some theory suggests corruption might have
a positive impact in places with dysfunctional political institutions. This
paper investigates whether the corruption-growth link is conditional on the
extent of government involvement across U.S. states. Even though no state
approaches the level of government intervention found in many developing
countries, we still find evidence that corruption’s harmful effects on growth
are smaller when regulation is greater.
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1 Introduction
Corruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public power for private gain, is an en-
demic feature of political life around the globe. It exists even in countries that enjoy
relatively good governance. Corrupt practices are widely condemned and a consistent
target of laws and investigations, even in regions where such behavior is common (Noo-
nan, 1984; Klitgaard, 1988). Arguments about the intrinsic immorality of corruption
go a long way in explaining these reactions. However, public outrage and frustration
are also driven by a sense that corruption has detrimental consequences for our social,
political, and economic lives.
The impact of corruption on economic growth is the subject of a large social science
literature. Many early researchers, sometimes known as the “greasers,” claimed cor-
ruption might have a positive impact in places with dysfunctional political institutions
(Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965). It could do so by effectively greasing the wheels of commerce
in the face of significant political obstacles. The opposite view, which has been called
the “sanders” position, argues that corruption “sands” the wheels of commerce and is
detrimental to economic growth (Aidt, 2009). According to one recent review, this last
position has “. . . achieved the status of received wisdom” (Haggard et al., 2008, 212).1
While we acknowledge the dominant point of the “sanders” that corruption is generally
bad for economic growth, this paper makes a useful contribution to the debate by offer-
ing support to the much-denigrated position of the “greasers.” We find that corruption
can be economically beneficial in certain political environments. In particular, we show
that, among the American states where government intervention in the economy is rela-
tively high, corruption’s effect on growth is less injurious to economic development and
even potentially positive. The intuition is that bureaucrats will offer businesses cor-
rupt bargains when government rules are particularly burdensome. In high-regulation
environments corruption may therefore be associated with higher economic growth.2
1A third group of scholars (Drury et al., 2006) argue that corruption has little impact one way or
the other.
2While on the margin corruption may increase growth under some circumstances, this finding
obviously does not imply that corrupt acts are justifiable, or that governments wishing to encourage
economic prosperity ought to find ways to foster corruption.
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2 Background
Although there is now a voluminous amount of research on the causes and consequences
of corruption, academic interest into these issues is relatively new. Indeed, most of the
academic literature dates from the last 40 years. This may be due to what Gunnar
Myrdal (1970) identified as a “taboo” about engaging in research on the issue – some-
thing that has fortunately been overcome.3
Many of the first scholars to address the specific issue of the relationship between
corruption and economic growth thought that it might actually play a positive role
under certain conditions. These were the theoretical originators of the “greaser” school
of thought. Leff (1964), for example, proposed that corruption can further economic
growth in countries with elites “hostile” to development by incentivizing bureaucrats
to aid entrepreneurs, reducing investor uncertainty about future government interven-
tion, and “sabotaging” bad economic policies. Likewise, Nye (1967, 427) thought that
corruption in some instances might provide “the only solution to an important obstacle
to development.” In particular, it could help promote capital formation, cut red tape,
and free entrepreneurs and minorities from hostile bias against them (420).
Most infamously, Huntington (1968, 68) argued that during modernization “[c]orruption
may be one way of surmounting traditional laws or bureaucratic regulations which
hamper economic expansion.” In fact, he thought that good or efficient governance in
such an instance might actually be worse for economic growth than a corrupt regime.
As he pithily noted, “The only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized,
dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy” (69).
Many others have followed in their footsteps, often adding empirical evidence to support
the “greaser” claim (Lui, 1996). Rock and Bonnett (2004, 1010), for example, argue that
while corruption in many developing countries is bad for growth, corruption in large East
Asian countries helped spur high growth by providing “stable and mutually beneficial
exchanges of promotional privileges for bribes and kickbacks.” Likewise, Egger and
Winner (2005, 949) find that “corruption is a stimulus for FDI.” More starkly, Me´on
and Weill (2010) demonstrate that corruption is positively correlated with efficiency in
countries with “ineffective” institutions. Some more narrow and descriptive studies like
3Although Myrdal’s pronouncement is more famous, the editor of the American Behavioral Scien-
tist noted the taboo a half decade before Leff (1964) wrote his famous piece.
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Levy (2007) also lend support to the greaser position.
The dominant view today, however, is that corruption has a negative impact on eco-
nomic growth, especially in developing countries. Indeed, the “sander” literature is
expansive and identifies a variety of different causal pathways by which corruption is
corrosive of development. For example, Mauro (1995, 683) found that corruption lowers
investment even in places “. . . in which bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome.”
Me´on and Sekkat (2005) build on this by noting that corruption is bad for growth even
controlling for the investment route. Murphy et al. (1991) and Murphy et al. (1993)
claim that corruption harms growth by misallocating key resources while buttressing
inefficient businesses. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption encourages se-
crecy, distortionary regulation, and bribery which, in turn, reduces economic efficiency
and growth.4
Figure 1: The Effect of Corruption Convictions on U.S. State Growth. Corruption
convictions per 100,000 people and growth rate of real gross state product are measured
as averages between 1975 and 2000.
Most studies of the relation between corruption and economic growth focus on devel-
oping countries. But is the impact of corruption in the developed world also negative
and important? Drury et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that corruption has
no significant impact either way in democracies. Yet there is disagreement about how
corruption impacts growth in the United States. Glaeser and Saks (2006) find no signif-
icant effect of corruption on U.S. growth. By contrast, Johnson et al. (2011) find that
it reduces growth and investment. Figure 1 seems to buttress the intuition that there
4See also Rose-Ackerman (1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Ades and di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000),
Drury et al. (2006), Fisman and Svensson (2007), and Aidt (2009).
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is a strong negative correlation between places with more corruption and the growth in
Gross State Product. As for Huntington, it is not clear whether he thought corruption
would grease the gears in fully modernized economies – but probably not given that
his examples of the virtues of corruption are all places in the process of modernization.
However, one could argue that corruption would play the same role regardless should
government display the features of rigidity, overcentralization, and sclerosis due to ex-
cessive governmental regulation (even though he probably did not think that highly
institutionalized states would display these features by definition). Indeed, this point is
supported by Goel and Nelson (1998), who find that state government size and spending
levels influence the amount of corruption.
To cement the idea that corruption may be efficient in in the presence of costly regula-
tion, consider the theoretical framework of Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They consider a
simple, but realistic, situation in which the government has imposed a regulation which
requires the purchase of a license or permit in order to engage in trade. A bureaucrat
is responsible for selling this license at a price P . For simplicity, the cost of a permit is
assumed to be zero. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium in the market for permits. The
total number of permits sold is equal to Q1, which is well below the efficient amount
of trade which would occur where the demand curve D(P ) intersects the x-axis. Thus,
at least within this narrow comparative statics framework, this is a case in which the
government has imposed an inefficient regulation on market activity.5
Now imagine that the bureaucrat is corrupt and he requires a bribe for each permit sold.
If the bureaucrat continues to also pay the government P for each permit sold, then
this corresponds to a situation in which corruption unambiguously increases the size of
the deadweight loss. The new “price” of a permit is illustrated in Figure 2 as P +Bribe
which corresponds to fewer permits being granted. The corrupt agent sells Q2 permits
whereas his honest counterpart sells Q1. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point
out, it is also possible that the corrupt bureaucrat chooses to steal from his government
employers and, instead of setting the price of a permit at P + Bribe, he could make
more money by simply setting the price at Bribe. In this case of “Corruption with theft
(from the government),” the amount of trade is Q3 and efficiency is increased relative
to the no corruption case. By contrast, if the bribe is set above the official price of a
permit, then we are back in the world in which corruption decreases market efficiency.
5Of course, this model has nothing to say about externalities, let alone distributional issues.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium trade under no corruption, corruption without theft from the
government, and corruption with theft from the government.
The foregoing discussion suggests some theoretical reasons why we might expect the
marginal social cost of corruption to be less in places with more costly regulation. In
U.S. states in which government size and scope is relatively small, higher growth levels
will naturally result and development will face less economic drag due to the downside
of corruption highlighted by the “sanders.” However, where state size and scope are
significantly greater, some level of corruption will work to grease the gears of growth by
allowing individuals to avoid costly regulation, thus creating a more stable and favorable
investment climate than in a system without corruption (Leff, 1964).6 As suggested by
the simple theory outlined above, however, whether corruption decreases or increases
trade is ultimately an empirical question.
6Of course, these potential stories invite the question of why politicians and bureaucrats in low
regulation states do not pursue more regulatory efforts in order to extract rents from potential clients
who will pay to overcome them. In other words, why are these people leaving money on the table, so
to speak? The answer presumably has to do with the incentives of politicians to delegate bureaucratic
discretion or constrain bureaucrats (Duvanova, n.d.). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper,
it may be that there is a relationship between freedom and public probity, or a political culture that
helps produce both.
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3 Data and Identification Strategy
To test whether the economic cost of corruption decreases where government involve-
ment is greater, we estimate the following model:
growth i = α + β1corruption i + β2freedom i + β3corruption i ∗ freedom i + (1)
γinitial capital i +X
′
iη + regionsi + i
where i subscripts each state, X is a vector of control variables, regions is a vector of
region dummies, and  is an i.i.d. error term.
The dependent variable is real annualized growth in gross state product (GSP) per
worker over the period 1975-2000, taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We
choose this period because it is the longest period over which we have both GSP and
corruption data available.
Our central independent variables are corruption, “freedom,” and the interaction be-
tween the two. Corruption is the annual number of federal corruption convictions of
federal, state, and local officials per 100,000 population from the U.S. Department of
Justice. This indicator has been commonly used in the literature, and previous research
has found it to be related directly and inversely to the growth in gross state product
(Johnson et al., 2011). Because corruption may be endogenous in this model, we will
also instrument for it in several specifications (details below). We expect corruption to
be negatively related to growth when freedom is at its maximum (β1 + β3 < 0). When
freedom is at its minimum, corruption’s effect on growth should be smaller, perhaps
even zero or positive (β1 + β3 = 0).
To measure government intervention in the economy, we use various indicators of “free-
dom” at the state level. The Fraser Institute has for a number of years produced an
indicator of economic freedom for American states and Canadian provinces, consisting
of fiscal and labor market policy measures (Karabegovic´ and McMahon, 2008). This
project produces two sets of numbers, one measuring only state- and provincial-level
interventions and one that includes the differential impact of federal policies on different
states. An odd aspect of the latter measure is that it penalizes states for the federal
spending within their borders, even though this spending is financed by the country as a
whole. There is therefore very little crowding-out of private GDP within a state due to
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federal spending within that state. (Of course, aggregate federal spending everywhere
may crowd out private GDP.) Supporting these contentions, Garrett and Rhine (2010)
find that only the purely state- and provincial-level indicators of different categories of
economic freedom are positively associated with employment growth. We therefore use
the state-level variable here.
Recently, Ruger and Sorens (2009) produced a set of indicators of economic, personal,
and “overall” freedom (overall freedom is the sum of the economic and personal freedom
variables), coded as of January 1, 2007, published by the Mercatus Center. The eco-
nomic freedom concept includes various regulatory and judicial policies in addition to
the usual fiscal variables, from minimum wage rates to eminent domain requirements.
The “personal freedom” concept also includes so-called “paternalistic” regulations such
as medical marijuana laws, home and private school regulations, and gambling restric-
tions. Given that the type of regulations most commonly considered harmful to trade
are contained in the “economic freedom” measure, we choose to focus on it in our
analysis.
We rescale both freedom variables to range from 0 (most government involvement in
economy) to 1 (least government involvement in economy). As expected, the two mea-
sures are highly correlated (ρ = 0.66). Descriptive statistics for both variables are given
in Appendix A.
As Johnson et al. (2011) note, using initial GDP per capita requires an assumption of
fixed technology across states. If this assumption is false, undesirable multicollinearity
intrudes on independent variables intended to measure aspects of technology such as
political institutions. As such, we include initial capital per capita in all regressions
to control for convergence effects (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992;
Solow, 2000). Our capital stock variable comes from Garofalo and Yamarik (2002) and
should be negative (γ < 0). We also include controls for human capital, demography,
and state fiscal policies, and regional fixed effects. All of these variables are described
in Appendix A.
We estimate our model using both ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares
(2SLS), and limited-information maximum-likelihood (LIML) regression. Our 2SLS
and LIML estimations instrument for corruption and the corruption-freedom interac-
tion term with waiting periods for voting eligibility, campaign finance restrictions, and
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durability of the state constitution. These variables are strong predictors of corruption
and also plausibly satisfy the exclusion restriction that they be uncorrelated with state
growth through any channel other than their effect on corruption.7
4 Econometric Results
In Table 1, we present the results for the “baseline” model which includes the corruption
variables and the controls but excludes the freedom variables and their interactions. We
present the coefficients and robust standard errors for the corruption and initial capital
per person variables to conserve space. We report the results for each estimator for
completeness but focus on the LIML results since they are robust to weak instruments.
Table 1: Baseline Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Growth in Real State GSP).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Numbers in
brackets indicate the percentage of a standard deviation of the dependent variable a one
standard deviation change in the independent variable induces. All regressions include
controls described in Appendix A as well as region dummies.
As suggested in the existing literature, corruption is detrimental to growth. The coeffi-
cient is negative and statistically significant. Also consistent with the literature, initial
capital stock is negatively related to growth.
In Table 2, we present the results for the complete model which includes the freedom
variables and their interactions. Panel A shows the estimates using the Fraser Insti-
tute’s Economic Freedom to proxy for government intervention in the economy, while
7Johnson et al. (2011) provide a more in depth discussion.
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Panel B shows the estimates using the Mercatus Center’s Index of Economic Freedom
(Ruger and Sorens, 2009). Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient on freedom
is always positive, though it is only significant under instrumental variables estima-
tion. The coefficient on corruption is positive (though consistent with zero) whereas
the coefficient on the interaction between corruption and freedom is consistently neg-
ative. The interaction variable is both statistically and economically significant under
instrumental variables estimation. According to our preferred LIML estimate in Panel
B, a one standard deviation increase in the interaction term results in almost a three
standard deviation decrease in the growth of GSP between 1975 and 2000. In other
words, as the amount of government intervention in the economy decreases, the nega-
tive effect of corruption on growth strengthens. This result is strongest under our LIML
estimates, which control for potentially weak instruments.
According to our discussion in Section 2, we expect the marginal effect of corruption
on economic growth to vary positively with the extent of government intervention. As
such we are interested in examining the sum of both the direct effect of corruption on
growth (β1) and the indirect effect (β3). Using equation (1), we can write the marginal
effect as,
∂growth
∂corruption
= β1 + β2freedomi (2)
where the standard error is,
σ =
√
var(βˆ1) + (freedomi)2var(βˆ2) + 2(freedomi)(cov(βˆ1βˆ2) (3)
Both the point estimate (2) and the standard error (3) of the marginal effect of cor-
ruption on economic growth depends upon the value of freedom. To facilitate the
interpretation of our results, we follow Brambor et al. (2006) and plot the marginal
effect (2) along with the 95% confidence interval using (3). Figure 3 presents these
plots using our preferred LIML results from Table 2.8
Both figures show that when freedom is above its mean corruption is harmful for growth.
However, for states in which government intervention in the economy is greater than
8The plots for the other regressions look similar.
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Table 2: The less regulation in a state, the more negative is the impact of corruption on
growth (Dependent Variable = Growth in Real State GSP). Larger values of the variable
“freedom” indicate less regulation in a state. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Numbers in brackets indicate the percentage of
a standard deviation of the dependent variable a one standard deviation change in the
independent variable induces. All regressions include controls described in Appendix A
as well as region dummies.
average, the effect of corruption is ambiguous. At the very lowest levels of freedom,
corruption may even be good for growth.
10
(a) Fraser Freedom Index
(b) Mercatus Economic Freedom Index
Figure 3: Effect of Corruption on State Growth as Regulation Decreases. Panel A uses
specification (3) from Panel A of Table 2. Panel B uses specification (3) from Panel B of
Table 2. Dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. Both figures indicate a marginal
cost of corruption consistent with zero for highly regulated states. By contrast, states
with less invasive regulatory environments face a negative and statistically significant
marginal cost of corruption.
5 Implications
We have presented evidence for the “grease” hypothesis about corruption and growth in
the United States, as unlikely a place as any for such a finding. It is commonly thought
that advanced industrial democracies have strong enough institutions that corruption,
to the extent that it exists, is an unalloyed negative. However, given the United States’
federal structure, state and local governments have considerable scope for economic
regulation. It appears that in the most highly regulated states the burden on business
is such that, on the margin, corruption may not actually be deleterious for growth. In
fact, it could even be positive.
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The usual cautions about interpreting causation from observational, non-experimental
data apply. However, we have done our best to address endogeneity concerns by in-
strumenting corruption in accordance with standard measures in the literature.
It is worth emphasizing that we do not advocate corruption as a solution for inefficiencies
introduced by “big government.” At best, it is only a second-best palliative in relatively
dysfunctional political systems. The best growth records we observe are those states
with both low corruption and little regulation. The economic lesson we take from these
results is that people don’t leave $100 bills on the sidewalk. If there is inefficiency in
a market, individuals will attempt to convert deadweight loss into surplus. The real
policy lesson from these results is that corruption can be a response to regulation.
As such, the possibility that rule of law may be undermined by the introduction of
market-distorting rules ought be considered in the regulation-making process.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Corruption convictions are reported by the U.S. Department of Justice (vari-
ous years). Fraser economic freedom data are from Karabegovic´ and McMahon (2008).
Mercatus economic freedom data are from Ruger and Sorens (2009). Real investment
and capital stock data are from Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). Real GSP data are from
Beemiller and Downey (1998) and Renshaw et al. (1988). Labor and population data are
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov). Education data are from the 1970
Census of Population and Housing. Fiscal variables are from the 1972 Census of Govern-
ments. Residency requirements, campaign finance, and constitution adoption data are
from Book of the States (1970).
15
